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Abstract 
Wage shares have fallen substantially in Europe since the early 1980s. To some extent this is due 
to a macroeconomic policy package that encourages wage flexibility and wage competition. A 
system of wage coordination in the Euro area would facility a return to a productivity-oriented 
wage policy by reducing wage competition. In a recent study on the demand effects of changes in 
functional income distribution Stockhammer, Onaran und Ederer (2007) find that the Euro area is 
in a wage-led demand regime. According to their results a reduction of the wage share by 1%-
point leads to a reduction of demand by around 0.2%-points of GDP. This finding has far 
reaching implications for economic policy. A stable wage share would help stabilize demand. 
The paper aims, first, at clarifying some conceptual issues in the design of a European system of 
productivity-oriented wage coordination and, second, it discusses the economic policy 
implications of wage coordination. The present policy package assigns wages the role of a shock 
absorber. However, as wage reductions do have negative demand effects in a wage-led demand 
regime, this policy has a deflationary bias. A system of wage coordination will thus have to be 
complemented by a more active nation fiscal policies and more fiscal redistribution within the 
EU. If so a regime of productivity oriented wage coordination will help to stabilize demand and it 
is consistent with price stability.  
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Wage Flexibility or Wage Coordination? Economic Policy Implications of the Wage-led 
Demand Regime in the Euro Area 
 
Functional income distribution has shifted dramatically in the past 25 years. The wage share in 
the Euro area has fallen by ten percentage points since 1981. This is the outcome of economic 
forces like globalization and technical change, but it has also been the result of deliberate policy 
pursued by the European Commission (EC) and by some national governments. Despite this 
drastic fall in wages relative to productivity unemployment has not decreased substantially. It is 
still higher than it was in 1981. The recommendations of the OECD and the EC to fight 
unemployment center around making labor markets more flexible. Wages should respond to 
national (or regional) conditions and increasing wage inequality is explicitly recommended. 
Wage moderation is regarded as golden way out of unemployment. 
 
Graph 1: Adjusted Wage Share and Unemployment in the Euro Area, 1960–2006 
50
52
54
56
58
60
62
64
66
68
70
1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005
A
dj
us
te
d 
W
ag
e 
S
ha
re
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e
adj WS
unempl.rate
 
Source: AMECO 
 2
 This paper takes a different view. Rather than reducing unemployment, wage competition 
has dri
y. 
 
 at 
ation 
hare. 
Section
and 
 
conomic and Economic Policy Factors in the Decline of the Wage Share 
Despite the substantial fall in the wage share in European countries mainstream economic 
institutions have, until recently, hardly discussed the issue. This has changed in the last year. 
                                                
ven down wages and wage moderation has contributed to depressed domestic demand. As 
the policies of labor market flexibility have proven unable to cure unemployment and stabilize 
income distribution, an alternative strategy is needed. Wage coordination across countries and 
sectors could help take competitive pressure off the shoulders of wage bargainers and would 
thereby be an important precondition for a re-establishing of productivity-oriented wage polic
Indeed the following discussion of wage coordination refers to productivity-oriented wage 
coordination.1 The aim of this paper is, first, to clarify potential problems in the design of a
coordinated productivity oriented wage policy at the European level. Second, the paper aims
highlighting that wage coordination is inconsistent with the present policy regime, which 
crucially relies on wage flexibility. A discussion of the political economy of wage coordin
(Niechoj 2004, Schulten 2004) or its political feasibility is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The paper first summarizes factors that have contributed to the decline in the wage s
 two discusses demand effects of wage moderation. Section three discusses possible 
designs of wage coordination. Section four summarizes the present policy regime of the EU 
the central role of wage flexibility therein. Section five outlines a policy regime for monetary and
fiscal policy that could complement a regime of wage coordination.  
 
E
 
1 The analysis at time presupposes a coordination of wages on the national level. In fact European countries differ 
substantially in their bargaining structures. Indeed, for some countries an effective European coordination of wages 
would presuppose a national coordination of wages.  
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Now the International Monetary Funds (IMF) admits that »globalization is one of several factors 
F 
7) 
countri ic 
 
ile 
the 
hould 
95: 7, EC 1996: 5, EC 1997: 14). The most recent 
Guidel
ents 
y of these wage pacts were part of efforts to 
that have acted to reduce the share of income accruing to labor in advanced economies« (IM
2007: 161), while also highlighting the role of technological change. Similarly the OECD (200
concludes that globalization (proxied by offshoring) has increased the vulnerability of workers. 
While part of the decline in the wage share is probably due to exogenous factors, a 
substantial part is policy-induced. First, globalization itself is development that has been fostered 
by deregulation and liberalization, in particular capital account liberalization. For European 
es, of course, the most important form of globalization is the Single Market. Econom
integration has distributional effects. Beyond the standard Stolper-Samuelson effects (according 
to which the abundant factor, that is capital in the European case, will gain) there will also be
bargaining effects. The mobile factor will benefit from liberalization because unlike the immob
factor it will take advantage of new opportunities (Rodrik 1997). As capital is more mobile than 
labor, the bargaining power of capital should increase, which will translate into an increase in 
wage elasticities of labor demand. Indeed Hatzius (2000) and OECD (2007) find that labor 
demand in Europe has become more elastic. 
Second, it has been a policy goal of the EU for many years to reduce the wage share. The 
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines for many years included that »real wage developments s
be below the increase in productivity« (EC 19
ines recommend »real wage increases in line with the underlying rate of productivity 
growth over the medium term,« but are clearly more worried about wage growth rising above 
trend productivity than falling below (EC 2005: 15). 
Third, there has been a series of national ›wage pacts‹ in the form of tripartite agreem
that had wage moderation at their core, complemented by a policy package that made it more 
attractive to labor unions (Schulten 2004). While man
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meet th
cy 
he causes of the falling wage share, now we will turn to its 
ffects, in particular its effects on aggregate demand. A decline of the wage share will push the 
stly, it will likely have 
ffect 
 are a 
 
share 
  Effects in 2005 Effects at mean levels 
e convergence criteria for the EMU, their significance is broader. Given that the present 
EU policy package restrains the use of fiscal and monetary policy for national aims, wage poli
gains importance as a policy area. Effectively the present policy regime encourages wage 
competition between EU countries.  
 
Demand Effects of Changes in Functional Income Distribution 
So far we have been concerned with t
e
various components of aggregate demand in different directions. Fir
depressing effect on (private) consumption expenditures because wage income is typically 
associated with a higher consumption propensity than profit income. Secondly, it will have an 
expansionary effect on investment as profitability is rising. Thirdly, it will have a positive e
on net exports because the falling wage share is equivalent to a fall in unit labor costs which
measure of price competitiveness. The overall or net effect is thus a priori indeterminate and 
depends on the specific size of the respective effects (Blecker: 1999, Bhaduri/Marglin 1990). 
Table 1 summarizes the results of Stockhammer et al. (2007a), who estimated such a model for 
the Euro area.  
 
Table 1. Private excess demand (in %-points of GDP) caused by a 1%-point increase of the wage
 
Consumption  0.43 0.37 
Investment -0.07 -0.07 
Domestic  excess demand 0.35 0.30 
Net exports -0.16 -0.11 
 Private exc s demand: es 0.17 0.19 
N ess demand is the sum effects of a chang ome distribution on consumption, 
i d net exports given the l ncome.  Source:  Stockhammer et al (2007), Table 7 
ote. Private exc  of the e in inc
nvestment, an evel of i based on
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 T  differ in the method of calculation, an increase in the wage share 
GDP. 
his estimate is the lower bound of the actual effect as it does not account for second round 
 
of table 1 imply that the Euro 
area wo
 
ve a 
s are 
                                                
hey find that, with minor ences 
by one percentage point leads to an increase in (private excess) demand by 0.17 percent of 
T
effects such as the effect of increased demand on investment.  
The size (and the sign) of this effect crucially depends on the openness of the economy. In
other words, small open economies are likely to be profit led, because foreign trade constitutes a 
much larger share of their GDP.2 Indeed, the parameters estimates 
uld switch from a wage-led to a profit-led demand regime at export and import shares of 
23 percent to 30 percent. This has important policy implications for the Euro area. While demand
is wage-led in the Euro area as a whole, this finding does not extend to individual Euro member 
states. The Euro area is a relatively closed economy, but its member states typically are rather 
open economies, with most of their trade conducted with other member states. It seems therefore 
likely that many EU member states exhibit (individually, not collectively) profit-led demand 
regimes. This is an example of a fallacy of composition. If so, European wage policy is in a 
prisoners’ dilemma-type situation. While for each country it may be expansionary to exercise 
wage moderation (assuming constant wages abroad), wage moderation in all countries will ha
contractionary effect. This is likely to generate a downward bias in wage settlements if wage
negotiated nationally.  
 
 
2 See Bowles/Boyer (1995), Naastepad/Storm (2006), Hein/Vogel (2008) for studies on several countries. 
Stockhammer et al. (2007b) offer a careful treatment of the effects of globalization and find that Germany is in a 
wage-led demand regime. 
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Wage Coordination 
f European wage coordination look like? Productivity-oriented wage policy 
)
 (1) 
ominal wage growth, w stands for growth of labor productivity, p is the inflation rate and pECB 
the inflation target of the ECB, WS represents the wage share, u is the unemployment rate and W the level of wages; 
his equation decomposes wage formation into effects related to productivity, effects related to 
le the 
will 
o productivity and 
inflatio  
How could a system o
means that wages grow in line with inflation plus productivity growth. While it is straightforward 
to define productivity-oriented wage policy at the national level, this turns out to be more 
complicated at the European level. Equation (1) below illustrates this by decomposing the 
potential determinants of wages: 
 
( ) ( 444444 844444 76321
4444 8444 76
443421
termseconvergenc
jEUjEU
flexiblitywage
j
indexationprice
ECBEUj
indexationtyproductivi
EUj
j WWbWSWSbubpbpbpbxbxbw
_
87
_
6
_
543
_
21 −+−+−++++=
Where w represents n
superscript EU stands for the EU, superscript j for individual countries. 
 
T
inflation, effects related to unemployment (referred to as wage flexibility), and effects aimed at 
bringing about some kind of convergence within Europe. The equation allows to contrast 
different wage policies by giving different weights to the terms in the equation. For examp
EC’s aim to have a high degree of wage flexibility will be reflected in a high value for b6. The 
equation also highlights that wages can be linked to national or European values. Typically a 
given wage policy will ignore many of the possible determinants and many of the parameters 
therefore be zero. For example a strictly national policy would refer only to national levels of 
inflation and productivity growth, therefore b2, b4 and b5 would all be zero.  
Productivity-oriented wage policy means that wages are fully linked t
n. In a national system of productivity-oriented wage setting the relevant reference values
for productivity and inflation, which means that b1 and b3 would be equal to one, whereas the 
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other parameters are nil (or at least small). A European system of a coordinated productivity-
oriented wage policy thus faces the question whether the reference values for inflation and 
productivity growth should refer are the national ones or the European ones, which will hav
different macro economic implications. 
The European Trade Union Cong
e 
ress (ETUC) is the umbrella organization of trade unions 
in Euro
. 
lative 
ed. If one also 
 
 towards national productivity 
growth
 
be 
                                                
pe, but it neither negiotiates wages itself nor does it have the power to impose its power 
on national (or sectoral) unions. It has endorsed a coordinated productivity-oriented wage policy
The ETUC recommends that wages growth with national productivity growth and the European 
inflation target of the European Central Bank (ECB) (Schulten 2004). Thus the wage formula of 
the ETUC would have b1 und b5 close to one and the other parameters nil.  
Such a strategy would ›freeze‹ the relative unit labor costs, and hence the re
competitiveness, of the countries at the point in time when wage coordination start
wanted to avoid current account imbalances across countries the relative unit labor costs (and 
consequently wage shares) would have to converge. This case is represented above as b7 being
non-zero. A convergence of living standards on the other hand would require a convergence of 
wage levels (rather than wage shares, here: b7=0 and b8>0).3
The aim of the ETUC is that wages should be oriented
 and the European inflation target of the ECB. This implies that national labor unions 
should have a strong eye on European developments, which reduces their scope of action with
respect to national developments, which is why in the present policy regime unions will be 
reluctant to submit to such a regime. It would imply that Greek and Spanish workers would 
compensated for the ECB inflation target rather than for their actual inflation rates (which are 
 
3 Note that wage policy could aim at either a convergence of competitiveness or at a convergence of living standards. 
Only if structural policies (such as fiscal support for countries) were to ensure a convergence of productivity across 
countries, would the two be consistent. 
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higher). Unsurprisingly such a system meets with resistance. With Eastern enlargement the 
tension will increase further. Assuming that Central and Eastern European economies will ca
up, they are also likely to experience higher inflation rates than the EU average. Without further 
adjustment mechanism the wage share would thus fall in these countries.  
There is thus need to refine the ETUC’s wage formula, though it ca
tch 
n serve as a useful 
starting e 
age Flexibility and the Present EU Policy Regime 
n the Euro area, is characterized by two 
ly 
 
is 
 
d it is not very effective. First, as 
wages 
 is 
 
 point. A pragmatic implementation might however mitigate the resulting problems. Th
much bigger problem is however, not possible long-term divergences that are implied, but that 
wage coordination is inconsistent with present EU policy package.  
 
W
The macro economic policy package currently in place i
features: First, there is a common currency and consequently a common monetary policy, which 
is conducted by an independent central bank that is almost exclusively concerned with price 
stability. Second, as EU fiscal policy is negligible quantitatively, fiscal policies are effecitive
national and they are (asymmetrically) severely constrained by the Stability and Growth Pact. In
this setting wage policy plays a crucial role as a shock absorber for asymmetric as well as for 
symmetric shocks, which is why the ECB is consistently insisting that labor market flexibility 
needed to ensure the proper functioning of the monetary union (Alsopp/Artis 2003). Indeed, with
exchange rates gone, monetary policy centralized and fiscal policy constrained, one is almost 
tempted to say that wages are the only adjustment mechanism.  
However, adjustment through wages is socially costly an
are never perfectly flexible, an adjustment through wages usually requires substantial 
amounts of unemployment, which involves high social and personal costs. Second, if demand
wage-led in the EU, then flexible wages will send perverse signals in the case of adverse demand
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shocks. Rather than stimulating demand, falling wages (or more precisely falling wage shares) 
will dampen demand further. While it may work in one country, this will have negative (deman
externalities for other countries and it does not work for the EU as a whole.  
Therefore the whole design of the policy package in Europe has to be modifie
d) 
d. Monetary policy 
n Alternative Policy Regime 
ination would thus have to be complemented by a policy 
d to 
ainly lie 
 
em puts an asymmetric burden on countries with a trade deficit in that the 
EC enc
equation. 
                                                
would have to get reoriented to output stabilization or fiscal policy would need more room (and 
coordination) for counter-cyclical policy, in particular in the face of asymmetric shocks. 
 
A
A system of EU-wide wage coord
regime that put shock absorbers other than wages in place.4 Exchange rate policy, which use
serve as a shock absorber, is irrevocably gone. Monetary policy can do little to address 
asymmetric developments within the union.5 The main burden of adjustment would cert
with (national) fiscal policy, which would have to be more pro-active to address imbalances. An 
expanded system of (automatic) fiscal transfers from fast growing to slow growing regions would
be an obvious system.  
The present syst
ourages only deficit, but not surplus countries to adjust. A system of wage coordination on 
the other hand would spread the burden more equally in that the surplus countries (assuming that 
they have a lower inflation rate), would automatically provide some of the adjustment via 
incorporating the (higher) European rather than the (lower) national inflation in its wage 
 
4 The policy package is similar to that suggested by Hein and Truger (2004). Theoretical aspects of this policy mix 
are discussed (in a single country setting) by Hein and Stockhammer (2007). Arestis et al. (2001) and Huffschmid 
(2005) present proposals in a similar spirit. 
5 A system of asset based reserve requirements could make some contribution by treating mortgages differently in 
countries with overheating property markets (Palley 2006). 
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 Conclusion 
 fact, the dominant tendency is towards greater decentralization rather than centralization or 
of wage bargaining (though not universally). Decentralization of collective 
or costs 
y.6 
ent remains high. Moreover, unit labor costs 
have be
age 
 it 
 
 
                                                
In
coordination 
bargaining has been a policy goal of major institutions like the OECD and the EC. Employer 
organizations have no interest in a centralization of bargaining. The divergence of unit lab
across Europe suggests that unions have not been able or willing to coordinate wage effectivel
They have often joined national regimes of wage moderation to stimulate exports in exchange for 
concessions in social policy and other areas.  
The economic performance resulting from this policy has been disappointing. Wage 
shares have declined substantially and unemploym
en diverging since the introduction of the Euro. A system of productivity-oriented 
coordinated wage bargaining would contribute to achieving the policy goals of an equitable 
distribution of income, to stabilize demand and to guarantee price stability. As regards the 
distribution of income, wage coordination could contribute to stabilizing the wage share as w
competition is reduced. As a stable (or rising) wage share has expansionary demand effects
would help maintaining the economy at full capacity. Finally, as long as wage coordination is 
productivity oriented is consistent with price stability. It would also help prevent price 
divergences across countries. 
 
 
 
6 Pointing to the decreased coefficient of variation of the growth rates of wages Marginson/Sisson (2004) argue that 
an implicit coordination of wages has taken place. However, this is a misleading indicator if some countries 
consistently have above average wage growth and some below average. And this has been the case since the 
introduction of the Euro.  
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